Myths and Facts About Iraq's Aluminum Tubes
from FAS Project on Government Secrecy

The discovery three years ago that Iraq was seeking to procure thousands of aluminum tubes was promptly interpreted by the Central Intelligence Agency as a sign that Saddam Hussein was pursuing uranium enrichment centrifuge technology for a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

That assessment, leaked to the press and uncritically reported, helped bolster the Bush Administration case for war against Iraq.

But now all indications are that the CIA assessment was wrong, according to David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), who has authored a detailed review of the aluminum tube controversy.

"Since the fall of Baghdad last spring, no evidence has emerged that Iraq planned to use the aluminum tubes in centrifuges. Despite months of searching, the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) has not found any link between the tubes and a gas centrifuge program," Albright wrote...

Among other lessons learned, Albright notes that the National Intelligence Estimate process proved to be a poor instrument for adjudicating the significance of the aluminum tubes. Crucially, of the ten or so intelligence agencies that each had one vote on the Estimate, those with technical expertise in centrifuge technology were outnumbered by those without such expertise.

Maybe instead of demanding expanded powers, the intellingence community should focus on making sure the powers they already have are used well. See below for the full text.

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SECRECY NEWS
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2003, Issue No. 106
December 9, 2003


MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT IRAQ'S ALUMINUM TUBES
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN A TIME OF CRISIS
NAVY MEMO ON FISA
CRS ON TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS
** SUPPORT SECRECY NEWS


MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT IRAQ'S ALUMINUM TUBES

The discovery three years ago that Iraq was seeking to
procure thousands of aluminum tubes was promptly interpreted
by the Central Intelligence Agency as a sign that Saddam
Hussein was pursuing uranium enrichment centrifuge
technology for a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear weapons
program.

That assessment, leaked to the press and uncritically
reported, helped bolster the Bush Administration case for
war against Iraq.

But now all indications are that the CIA assessment was
wrong, according to David Albright, president of the
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), who
has authored a detailed review of the aluminum tube
controversy.

"Since the fall of Baghdad last spring, no evidence has
emerged that Iraq planned to use the aluminum tubes in
centrifuges. Despite months of searching, the Iraqi Survey
Group (ISG) has not found any link between the tubes and a
gas centrifuge program," Albright wrote.

Albright traces the development of the aluminum tube story
from its earliest beginnings to the latest equivocations on
the matter by David Kay of the CIA's Iraq Survey Group.

Among other lessons learned, Albright notes that the National
Intelligence Estimate process proved to be a poor instrument
for adjudicating the significance of the aluminum tubes.
Crucially, of the ten or so intelligence agencies that each
had one vote on the Estimate, those with technical expertise
in centrifuge technology were outnumbered by those without
such expertise.

At a time when intelligence oversight has moved entirely
behind closed doors and is effectively dormant, Albright's
review significantly enriches the public record on this
controversial matter.

See "Iraq's Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact from Fiction" by
David Albright, Institute for Science and International
Security, December 5:

http://tinyurl.com/yfr8

The most damning thing one could say about an intelligence
agency is not that it sometimes makes mistakes in analysis,
which is inevitable, but that it refuses to admit its
mistakes. When an agency cannot admit error, it cannot
learn from its own missteps and is doomed to mediocrity.

In a recent publication, Stuart Cohen, Vice Chairman of the
National Intelligence Council, finds no reason to
acknowledge a single flaw in U.S. intelligence on Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction. It is the critics, he says,
who have it wrong.

See "Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft
Myths" by Stuart Cohen, November 28:

http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2003/11/cia112803.html

But whether CIA admits it or not, the Agency is already
paying a price in credibility for having acquiesced in
overstating the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

So when the CIA issues an assessment on North Korea's nuclear
weapons program, for example, it is now roundly met with
skepticism by national security experts, as the Los Angeles
Times reported today.

See "N. Korea's Nuclear Success Is Doubted" by Douglas
Frantz, Los Angeles Times, December 9:

http://tinyurl.com/yfqm

posted by prof_booty | 08:28 AM