01/13/2004: 
Breaking News
US Team Visits Nuclear Site In DPRK
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An unofficial US delegation on 10 January visited the Yongbyon nuclear site.
The opening of the site to the international community for the first time since International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors were ejected in January 2002 is not borne of a new-found desire to embrace transparency. The regime is not about to allow unrestricted access to its nuclear programme or invite inspectors to return. It has stated that it considers Libya's 19 December 2003 renunciation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to be ill considered and will not take the same approach. Instead, the regime is motivated by a desire to strengthen its bargaining position ahead of the next round of multilateral talks.
North Korea's consent to the unofficial inspection performs two tactically inspired functions. First, it enables the regime to appear conciliatory ahead of anticipated negotiations. This intensifies the pressure on the US to make concessions by allowing parties interested in pushing progress, such as China, to point to North Korea's actions to request that the US administration reciprocates. Secondly, it bolsters the regime's claims to have a functional nuclear arsenal. This forces the US to take North Korea seriously and gives it more leverage during the negotiations.
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12 Jan 2004
> US TEAM VISITS NUCLEAR SITE
An unofficial US delegation on 10 January visited the Yongbyon nuclear site.
The opening of the site to the international community for the first time since International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors were ejected in January 2002 is not borne of a new-found desire to embrace transparency. The regime is not about to allow unrestricted access to its nuclear programme or invite inspectors to return. It has stated that it considers Libya's 19 December 2003 renunciation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to be ill considered and will not take the same approach. Instead, the regime is motivated by a desire to strengthen its bargaining position ahead of the next round of multilateral talks.
The delegation, comprising US academics and former officials, is being guarded about what it was shown. Members have said that they wish to report back to the US administration before making public the details of their visit. The regime is reported to have revealed some of its stock of weapons-grade plutonium. The fissile material, which has been extracted from fuel rods processed at the Yongbyon reactor, can be used to construct a nuclear device. It is not clear whether the regime already has any nuclear devices, though the US has for years suspected that it had enough fissile material to make two devices. North Korea made claims throughout 2003 that it was reprocessing plutonium at the Yongbyon site.
North Korea's consent to the unofficial inspection performs two tactically inspired functions. First, it enables the regime to appear conciliatory ahead of anticipated negotiations. This intensifies the pressure on the US to make concessions by allowing parties interested in pushing progress, such as China, to point to North Korea's actions to request that the US administration reciprocates. Secondly, it bolsters the regime's claims to have a functional nuclear arsenal. This forces the US to take North Korea seriously and gives it more leverage during the negotiations.
In a similar vein, the regime on 6 January said that it would suspend its nuclear programme. The aim of the offer, as with the nuclear inspection, is to shift the burden of expectation back on to the US. The regime has requested a resumption of heavy oil shipments, its removal from the US' blacklist of states that sponsor terrorism and the lifting of sanctions. A similar proposal was made in December 2003. The US has already indicated that it will not be satisfied with a mere suspension of the nuclear programme and will adhere to its policy of not trading concessions or ‘rewarding' bad behaviour. It will insist on the permanent dismantling of the regime's nuclear programme alongside intrusive inspections. The US will baulk at any deal that resembles the discredited 1994 Agreed Framework, secured by then-president Bill Clinton, which froze the regime's nuclear programme.
Fresh negotiations
Preparations have been under way since late 2003 for a fresh round of negotiations, though these will not be held until February at the earliest. Neither the US nor North Korea sees any advantage in striving for a quick agreement, which, in any event, the cumbersome, six-way talks are unlikely to secure. Two or three days of talks in February or March will produce little in the way of new developments or concessions and a serious attempt by the US to break the deadlock is only likely to be attempted in 2005, after the November 2004 US presidential elections have been completed. However, there is no guarantee that North Korea will not rescind its offer to participate in negotiations. The regime will almost certainly engage in brinkmanship, pre-negotiation threats and hostile rhetoric in advance of the talks. This should not be interpreted as a genuine raising of the threat level.
North Korea's nuclear programme
The regime may already have one or two nuclear devices. Possession of multiple nuclear weapons would enable it to conduct a test, which would elicit alarm in the US and among neighbouring governments. However, it is in North Korea's interests to exaggerate its nuclear arsenal and to nurture fears about its nuclear capability because this strengthens its negotiating position at talks. There is no independent confirmation that the regime has any WMD. Evidence to suggest that North Korea was exporting its nuclear technology, particularly to rogue regimes or terrorist groups, would trigger a rapid escalation in tensions.
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